Yongwei Nian

Field: Economics

Research Interests: Development Economics, Political Economy

(Expected) Graduation: June 2024
 

References

• Francesco
  Decarolis francesco.decarolis@unibocconi.it
• Stefano
  Fiorin stefano.fiorin@unibocconi.it
• Guido
  Tabellini guido.tabellini@unibocconi.it

Contact



Email: yongwei.nian@phd.unibocconi.it

Phone: (+39) 348 6124341

Mobile: (+39) 348 6124341

JOB MARKET PAPER

Curbing Bureaucratic Information Manipulation

Bureaucrats are often incentivized to manipulate information, which may have real consequences. Leveraging China's 2009 reform punishing economic data manipulation and counties' quasi-random reform exposure, I provide rich causal evidence showing that the reform led to: (1) a decrease in GDP growth manipulation amounting to 5% of reported GDP growth, driven by a reputational discipline effect; (2) an increase in local officials' development effort manifested in both policy changes and downstream impacts, consistent with an effort reallocation effect. These results thus highlight the widespread costs of such manipulation and the welfare implications of curbing it. 

PUBLICATIONS

Nian, Y. (2023). Incentives, penalties, and rural air pollution: Evidence
from satellite data. Journal of Development Economics, 161, 103049.

Nian, Y., & Wang, C. (2023). Go with the Politician. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 15(2), 467-496.

WORKING PAPERS

Virtuous Leaders and Government Corruption

Reciprocity and State Capacity