Tax Havens No Longer Welcome

The financial crisis has pushed governments to find an agreement over "global governance" on the issue of tax havens. Many countries have signed treaties calling for cooperation and exchange of fiscal information among governements. We are probably witnessing a paradigm shift: from a not particularly efficient unilateral system to a bilateral system that seems to be working.
The reason behind lies in a changed perception of the damage caused by fiscal havens to the interests of OECD economies. Until the financial crisis, OECD countries and tax havens were linked by a concealed symbiotic relation: the havens benefited from capital outflows toward them, but also the financial sector in OECD economies drew benefits (e.g. tax shelters in the US) from the reduction of the global tax burden, with consequent activities of tax consulting and offshore financial flows. However, the crisis has altered the relation between OECD members and tax havens, turning it from symbiosis to parasitism, since there isn't any longer any offset for the reduction of the tax base caused by fiscal shelters: the big actors benefiting from aggressive fiscal strategies have shrunken in size, and governments have been hard pressed to find tax resources to fund stimulus programs. So in the new situation, the advantage for tax havens is perceived as a symmetric disadvantage for OECD economies, which have threatened non-cooperating countries with retaliating measures. The Italian approach has so far focused on the repatriation of capital abroad via a surreptitious form of tax amnesty, the so-called fiscal shield, while there have been no specific measures targeting offshore centers above the G7 and G20 guidelines on the issue. The exchange being proposed is this: if tax evaders repatriates capital at the limited tax rate of 5% they obtain a de facto tax amnesty; if they do not take advantage of the shield, foreign income is presumed to be due to tax evasion and sanctions are heightened and can include complete confiscation. But this is only an indirect measure vis-à-vis tax havens, since information exchange with foreign counterparts is not covered by the shield. The truth is that Italy has a strong need for extra liquidity and tax revenues. The final outcome of this operation is still uncertain, since there could be future capital outflows if information exchange with low-tax jurisdictions, starting with Switzerland, are not actually implemented.
The crucial question is whether the request for transnational cooperation will be supported by adequate policies or undermined by acquiescence vis-à-vis fiscal havens. Certain jurisdictions, like Switzerland, are starting to have an open exchange with market economies, while other tax havens, like Jersey or the Cayman islands, are, just like OECD countries, considering the introduction of the new forms of taxation to compensate for decreased fiscal receipts. Welcome to the club!