Between Power and Reality
The US attack on Iran provides only the latest illustration of the tendency of big powers to use military power without any regard to international law and conventions.
But we must recognize the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. How should Europe navigate this world of raw power, both in political and economic terms? How can it survive between an erratic US and an economically overpowering China?
Realism and the Primacy of Security
The first step is to adapt ambition to the limited resources that Europe has at its disposal.
Security comes first. While the world’s attention is now focused on the Gulf, Ukraine continues its fight for survival thus protecting the rest of Europe. It is this war, going now into its fifth year, that represents the crucial threat for European security. The increased spending on defense should thus concentrate on ensuring that Europe can defend itself against any Russian aggression even without support from the US. This requires joint efforts to close existing capability gaps in missile defense and space. A Europe that needs US help to defend itself will never become a credible global actor.
Limits of European Military Action
Europe should not strive for a global military reach. Missions to the Gulf or East Asia represent a distraction from the key goal of ensuring Europe’s security against a Russia with imperial ambitions — and maintaining the fragile calm around the Mediterranean.
A crisis in the Middle East of course impacts Europe, but European influence in this region is close to zero. A small contribution to a multi-national force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open after hostilities end is all Europe could and should plan for.
Economic Strength and Vulnerability
Europe is still a global economic power. Its GDP is of a similar order of magnitude as that of the US and China, and the EU comes only second in trade. But the EU is clearly the most vulnerable among the big powers. Unlike the US, it depends wholly on imports for its energy needs (China at least has abundant domestic coal). Moreover, Europe is weak in many frontier technologies. AI represents a telling example. European researchers contribute an important share of academic research in this field. But European firms are virtually absent from the commercial development of AI. The single European entrant in this field, Mistral, is a mid-sized also-run.
Alliances and Technological Autonomy
The combination of a large economy, strong trade performance and strength in research provide the basis for Europe’s soft power. But these assets need to be leveraged through an alliance with mid-sized like-minded middle powers, like Canada, Australia, Japan and, closer to home, the UK that can help reduce Europe’s vulnerabilities.
For example, several countries have expressed an interest in joining the EU’s framework program for research as associate members. Creating a global alliance in research would also help Europe catch up in the areas in which it is weakest, like chips production or space.
Another advantage of such an alliance would be to help break free from the stranglehold of US hyperscalers in key technologies. This represents an acute security risk as these companies are ultimately under the control of the US administration. The aim should not be to create alternatives under EU control, but to develop alternative solutions jointly with other countries, possibly as open source, so no single country can control them. All participants would gain, and the market for alternatives to the dominant US software bundles would be much bigger than if it was only the EU.
The main obstacle to this course of action is hubris in Brussels. The EU is much larger than any one of its like-minded partners. This invites EU officials to assume that they can dictate the terms under which other countries can join EU initiatives and how they should be run.
Trade and Europe’s Global Role
Trade represents the strongest asset for the EU. Trump’s attack on global trade has largely failed. The US trade deficit has not improved, global trade has expanded and US importers have borne most of the cost of tariffs. This confirms once more that protectionism is mainly self-defeating. The trade agreement with the US of last summer was widely decried as a capitulation. But exercising ‘power’ by retaliating at that moment would have been useless. The EU essentially agreed to let the US shoot itself in the foot. There are better ways to support the rules-based global order than pick a fight with the US, for example by playing a leading role in buttressing an existing agreement among 66 countries to accept a substitute dispute settlement mechanism. But this can work only if the EU eschews the temptation to use trade defense mechanisms for its own political ends.
Europe should not pretend to be or become a superpower. Rather it should strive to become the leader of a global coalition of middle-power democratic nations. By securing its own borders against Russia and pooling its research and trade weight with like-minded partners from London to Tokyo, the EU can escape the binary trap of the US-China rivalry. However, this requires Brussels to trade its penchant for dictating terms when it deals with smaller partners for a new spirit of genuine partnership. If Europe cannot learn to lead among equals, it will find itself increasingly alone in a world of raw power.
