Time for strategic autonomy

Military security delegated to the United States, cheap energy from Russia, and growth driven by globalization. This was the trifecta that guaranteed peace and prosperity for Europe for decades. A combination that today appears definitively outdated.

Russia’s attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 exposed the energy vulnerability of EU countries, and since security became once again an existential priority, the United States has shown signs of growing disengagement: less willing to automatically warrant the Continent's defense, more assertiveness on the trade front, and geostrategic priorities increasingly focused elsewhere. This has exposed the fragility of a model based on dependencies that have proven, predictably or not, politically unstable.

A new context of fragility

In this context, made even more complex by the internal political challenges of EU countries, with weak growth, stagnant wages, and increasingly unsustainable welfare systems, redefining Europe's role is no longer a theoretical exercise, but a political necessity. In the debate sparked by the need to develop a strategic response to these joint challenges, there are three concrete alternatives.

A first position proposes a clear and immediate break with the United States. The recent attack on Iran, with its implications for the role of international law and energy costs, has significantly strengthened this position in the political debate. At the same time, this position is often accompanied by reticence about, or outright opposition to, the idea of ​​significantly increasing defense spending, especially when welfare and public services are under stress. This stance reflects a real and widespread malaise, but it also comes up against a fact difficult to ignore: Europe currently lacks the tools to independently guarantee its own short-term security. In a context of growing threat, a rapid disengagement from the United States without a parallel strengthening of its own defense system risks resulting in immediate vulnerability.

A gradual transition and its costs

A second position instead advocates for a gradual transition toward greater autonomy. This is a more pragmatic, but also more cumbersome position. In the short term, it involves accepting an asymmetric relationship with the US and making the best of a bad situation on important issues, from the imposition of tariffs to unilateral military initiatives such as the conflict with Iran. Above all, it carries a significant political cost: forcefully condemning Russia while simultaneously avoiding an open confrontation with the United States exposes the European Union to accusations of double standards and contributes to eroding the credibility of the multilateral institutions and international law it claims to uphold.

Alternatives and limits to European autonomy

A third position, finally, considers China as a possible strategic alternative. This perspective is gaining traction due to transatlantic tensions and China's growing economic clout, but it has clear limitations. China is not a credible substitute for the United States in terms of security, and at the same time, it is a country whose political model and interests are often at odds with those of Europe. Furthermore, the growing convergence between China, Russia, and Iran makes it difficult to imagine true Chinese neutrality with respect to European interests. Rather than autonomy, the risk is that of creating a new, and even less desirable, form of dependence.

The point, therefore, is not simply to choose between the United States and China, but to recognize that Europe today faces limited options precisely because of choices she made in the past. The renunciation of true strategic autonomy was the product of a balancing act that for years was convenient but shortsighted.

Today, that model is no longer sustainable, and Europe finds itself without the tools to rapidly replace it. The real variable is time: the speed at which the EU can reduce its dependence from the US by building a credible and capable security system. Without this step, any idea of ​​disengagement remains a leap in the dark. In the short term, it is difficult to imagine a Europe that can do without the United States. But the real question is not whether Europe can afford autonomy, but whether it has the political will to actually create the conditions to do so.