When the Earth Dies, the Hard Right Grows

Collective economic shocks can radically change the political geography of an area, fueling support for far-right parties. These include not just financial or industrial crises, but also events seemingly far removed from politics, such as a plant epidemic. A new Bocconi study shows that the bacterium Xylella fastidiosa, responsible for the devastation of Apulia’s olive trees, triggered a 2.2% increase in votes for far-right lists in the affected areas. But the phenomenon is not uniform: what made the difference was a pre-existing perception of being neglected by the state. Where public services were lacking, resentment exploded, transforming the agricultural scourge into a political tinderbox.

The study, titled “Without Roots: The Political Consequences of Collective Economic Shocks,” was conducted by Simone Cremaschi (Bocconi University), Nicola Bariletto (University of Texas at Austin) and Catherine E. De Vries (Bocconi University) and published in the American Political Science Review. Based on a quantitative difference-in-difference analysis of electoral data and a field survey in two communities in Apulia, the authors highlight how the Xylella epidemic has transformed economic hardship and identity loss into consensus for the far right.

“These events are not just agricultural disasters. They are collective traumas that rewrite local political dynamics,” explains Simone Cremaschi, Research Fellow at the Bocconi Department of Social and Political Sciences. “For many inhabitants of these areas, the olive tree is not just a tree. It is part of their family history, the local landscape and their sense of belonging. Its disappearance has created a kind of void that has fueled political resentment.”

When a plant infection becomes political

Xylella fastidiosa, accidentally introduced in Puglia in 2013, destroyed countless centuries-old olive trees and caused economic losses estimated at €1.2 billion in the first four years. But the most disruptive effect was social: the disappearance of an entire rural production system undermined traditions, identity and sense of community.

The field investigation focused on two municipalities in the Apulia region, indicated by the authors with the fictitious names Querceto and Prosopo for reasons of confidentiality. Querceto, a town with poor public services, saw a significant increase in the far-right vote. Here the epidemic was perceived as yet another demonstration of neglect by the central government, another episode in a narrative of marginalization that already existed before Xylella. Prosopo, on the other hand, a town equally affected but with better provision of government services, did not register significant changes in proportions of votes cast.

“Where public services were already lacking, Xylella reinforced a pre-existing sentiment: ‘they abandoned us,’” Cremaschi adds. “This made voters more inclined to support parties that channeled resentment against elites and vowed to defend forgotten localities.”

But Xylella’s effect on the ballot box was not limited to radicalizing the vote. Voter turnout in affected municipalities remained higher than in unaffected municipalities, marking a difference of almost 4%, indicating that the agricultural disaster mobilized voters rather than causing them to fall into apathy. This element belies the idea that this was just a generic protest vote: Xylella generated an active push towards the hard right, and not a simple rejection of politics.

Xylella, deindustrialization and other crises: a comparison

The Apulian case is part of a broader body of research studies on collective economic shocks. Plant epidemics have marked the political history of entire regions: from the potato blight in Ireland in 1845, which strongly contributed to anti-British radicalization, to the phylloxera that hit European vines in 1863. But the political effect of Xylella also brings back the memories of deindustrialization occurring in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.

In many areas affected by industrial decline, the disappearance of jobs has generated a rift between the local population and the central state, pushing voters towards parties that oppose traditional elites. The case of Xylella shows that this phenomenon is not limited to industrial areas, but can also affect the agricultural sector and the rural landscape.

Another key finding of the study concerns youth migration: after the Xylella epidemic, the population between 20 and 35 years of age fell by 3% in the affected municipalities. Young people have abandoned the areas devastated by Xylella, seeking opportunities elsewhere. This trend, if not reversed, could permanently change the demographic makeup of these territories, further strengthening the conservative element in the long term.

Mass uprooting and the responsibilities of the state

The case of Xylella shows that economic shocks are not just questions of government budget or aid. They are moments in which the sense of belonging to a community and the state can be strengthened or destroyed. In Apulia, the epidemic shattered an already fragile social fabric, exacerbating existing divisions and favoring parties that promise redemption to communities "left behind."

But the study also raises another question: could the government’s response have avoided this political drift toward reactionary extremism? The government allocated funds for the compensation for farmers and the replanting of resistant species, but researchers highlight that bureaucratic delays and political uncertainties amplified the perception of abandonment. "Institutions were not able to provide rapid and effective responses. This reinforced the idea that those who govern do not deal with the real problems of the people," underlines Cremaschi.

With climate change and globalization making these adverse events more frequent, the lesson of Xylella goes well beyond Apulia. Public policy cannot be limited to emergency management: it must prevent the kind of economic and social marginalization that makes communities vulnerable to the call of hard-right populism.

Because, as Xylella demonstrates, when people are uprooted by events, answers are sought in parties and forces that promise to protect those neglected and left behind by the government.