Why a War Now?

It has been almost three weeks since the US/Israel coalition began the war against Iran and it has become the world’s most watched crisis. Despite tactical successes such as killing top Iranian leaders, the coalition has failed to achieve its strategic goals: toppling the regime, protecting US allies, keeping markets calm. No wonder, then, that most analyses focus on how this war is going, and how it ends.

Why now? The roots of the conflict

But there is another question worth asking: why are Iran and the US fighting now? The timing is puzzling because these two countries have been enemies for almost 50 years and yet, until now, limited themselves to proxy wars and brief military exchanges. Similarly, Israel has advocated for such an attack for years but the US had refused. In short, these two countries have always had reasons to fight. What has changed?

Three key factors: leadership, deterrence and energy

I believe that the answer is threefold and carries clues about the future of US foreign policy. The first reason is the Trump administration’s lower perceived costs from war. The legacies of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan made previous US presidents reluctant to initiate wars. The Powell Doctrine, the post-Vietnam principle that the US should go to war only with clear objectives, overwhelming force, and a plausible exit strategy, exemplifies this caution. Against Iran, these criteria were difficult to satisfy, so other tools (economic sanctions, covert action, containment) were the preferred instruments. However, what was once unfeasible has become thinkable given Trump’s lower risk aversion, greater confidence in limited strikes, and fewer inhibitions about civilian deaths. 

A second change has been the perception of Iranian capabilities. Over the last decade, the US and Israel have repeatedly struck core Iranian interests without facing significant retaliation. Each episode, the assassination of Suleimani, weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and last summer’s 12 Days War, raised fears of massive Iranian retaliation that did not materialize. We now know that Iran chose to employ less than its full capacity to cause significant damage. At the time, however, each episode eroded the Iranian deterrent and made it seem like a paper tiger.

Finally, we must note a recent structural change in energy markets: the emergence of the US as the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas. Since 2019 it has been a net energy exporter. While not completely immune to global energy shocks, it is less vulnerable than energy-importers. Fear of the pump, a deterrent to previous US administrations, is a lesser concern for this one. 

Acknowledging these three factors (Trump’s character, Iran’s weakened deterrent, the US’s energy independence) does not mean that other factors like American officials’ ideological biases did not play a role in this conflict. Neither does it mean that the war is going exactly as planned by the U.S.; the U.S.’s flailing response to the blocked Strait of Hormuz indicates that the U.S. miscalculated. But they do explain why Washington saw the war as a manageable gamble. 

The consequences for Europe, between self-reliance and realism

These three factors do not just explain the outbreak of this war. They also carry direct implications for European foreign policy. In the medium-term, Europe should expect more US adventurism fueled by Trump’s character and the relative invulnerability of the US economy. To protect itself, Europe must invest in areas of dependence, such as defense and energy. There have already been several arguments for self-reliance (remember the strange Greenland episode), but the War in Iran reinforces that this is a necessity, not a choice.

In the short-term, Europe must consider how to use its capabilities end this conflict. This may mean helping the US reopen blocked trade routes by force. This is not about alliance loyalty or abstract commitments to transatlantic unity. Trump has open contempt for alliances and will not necessarily reciprocate European support in the future. 

Instead, Europe’s decision should be grounded in its own interests. Intervention may be justified because it mitigates the economic costs of the conflict for Europe itself. Allowing the United States to bear the consequences of its own strategic choices might be emotionally satisfying, but it is not necessarily rational if the spillover effects impose significant costs on European economies. Energy markets, trade flows, and regional stability matter more than schadenfreude. 

Europe can also use this opportunity to secure concessions from Washington on other issues such as Ukraine or trade. Trump understands such transactionalism. The critical question is credibility: any American concessions should be institutionalized rather than left to the discretion of this administration.

The War in Iran is, at one level, a story about Iran and the United States. At another level, it previews a world in which American power is exercised with few constraints and little predictability. The question for Europe is not whether this new world is welcome, but how to navigate it, and how quickly we are willing to build the tools to do so.