Striking the Top Without Invading: The New US Doctrine and the Iranian Unknown

The joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, represent the latest step in what appears to be a fundamental transformation in American military strategy. Less than two months after the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, Operation Epic Fury signals a new model: removing a rival head of state without a full-scale ground invasion.

In Venezuela, the objective seemed relatively clear, even if the domestic political aftermath remained uncertain. In Iran, by contrast, it is far from evident what the operation is ultimately meant to achieve. President Trump’s initial remarks pointed to regime change as the primary goal, but Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio later downplayed that interpretation, emphasizing instead the need to reduce Iran’s capabilities  . At the same time, the thousands of strikes that continued across the country suggest that the mission extends well beyond leadership removal, even if its precise objective remains ambiguous.

What Is the Real Objective?

Amid conflicting statements, one possible explanation is that the operation seeks to degrade Iran’s offensive capacity while hoping that the regime eventually collapses and a more cooperative figure emerges—perhaps from within the existing establishment. President Trump himself complicated this logic when he told the New York Times that he “had three very good choices” for who would run Iran, only to later say that the strikes had “knocked out most of the candidates”.

Another interpretation is more blunt: to weaken Iran regardless of the political outcome, even if that means triggering internal conflict. This would explain why the strikes targeted not only potential successors but also the Assembly of Experts—the body responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader—with attacks on the holy city of Qom.

The Risk of Escalation and Entrapment

Targeting a regime’s leadership without occupying the country carries serious risks that US policymakers may be underestimating. Such interventions can create a slippery slope, requiring deeper involvement either directly or indirectly. In Iran, discussions are already underway about arming rebels on the ground, a step reminiscent of the intervention in Libya. The United States is also considering sending additional troops to the region.

There is also a political and moral risk. Encouraging Iranians to rise up against the regime could repeat a troubling pattern in US foreign policy. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush called on Iraqis to “take matters into their own hands” and remove Saddam Hussein. Many responded, but the United States stood aside as the regime crushed the uprising, killing tens of thousands. If Washington now uses similar rhetoric, it may soon face a stark choice: escalate with ground forces or abandon those it encouraged to act.

Three Possible Scenarios

What happens next? A plausible short-term scenario is that the current regime remains in power—perhaps more isolated, but also more consolidated. In recent months, it has weathered multiple setbacks, including US and Israeli attacks in June 2025 and mass protests in December and January that were met with severe repression. Despite these pressures, the security apparatus has remained cohesive and loyal  . Continued external attacks could either weaken its resolve or strengthen its nationalist justification for broader repression. In such a scenario, Washington might declare victory—much as it did after the June 2025 strikes—only to find that the success is short-lived.

A second possibility is that the regime survives but a weaker leadership becomes more cooperative with the United States, echoing the Venezuelan case  . However, Iran’s entrenched security and administrative architecture, built over more than four decades across religious, military, and political institutions, makes this scenario less likely. Power in Iran does not rest solely in the hands of one individual; multiple autonomous centers may retain their orientation regardless of who occupies the top position.

A third scenario is regime collapse. This is the outcome most directly invited by President Trump’s rhetoric, yet it also appears to be the one for which the least preparation exists. Iran’s domestic opposition lacks cohesion and a unifying leader. Installing a figure based abroad, such as the son of the former Shah, would likely require a ground invasion. More troubling still is the possibility that regime collapse leads not to orderly transition but to fragmentation—elite infighting, regional divisions, or even civil war.

In short, striking at the top without committing troops on the ground may appear to be a strategic shortcut. History suggests otherwise. In Iran, the absence of a clear and coherent endgame may prove to be the most dangerous variable of all.