Contacts
If Washington continues to use tariffs as a geopolitical lever, the rules-based multilateral order will increasingly give way to power politics

The 2026 US midterm elections are not merely a referendum on President Trump's domestic agenda. They are also a test of a more consequential transformation: the redefinition of trade policy from an instrument of economic governance into an instrument of geopolitical power.

For decades, the United States was the principal architect of a rules-based trading system. The postwar order rested on a simple proposition: market access would be governed primarily by multilateral rules rather than political discretion. That premise is now under sustained challenge.

The second Trump Administration has not simply expanded the use of tariffs. It has altered their function. Tariffs are increasingly deployed not to address conventional trade distortions, but to influence migration policy, combat drug trafficking, reshape supply chains, pressure allies, punish geopolitical rivals and extract bilateral concessions. Access to the American market has become a strategic bargaining chip rather than the product of reciprocal legal commitments.

The Centrality of Emergency Powers

The legal significance of this shift is as important as its economic implications. Many of the administration's measures rely on statutory authorities designed for exceptional circumstances, particularly the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. National security, once a narrowly construed exception within international trade law, is becoming the organizing principle of US commercial policy. As recent analyses in the American Journal of International Law observe, emergency powers have moved from the periphery to the center of American trade governance.


This development creates tensions on two distinct legal planes. Domestically, courts are being asked whether Congress has delegated authority broad enough to permit the president to redesign the entire US tariff schedule through emergency legislation. Internationally, the same measures sit uneasily with the United States' obligations under the WTO, particularly the principles of non-discrimination, tariff bindings and the limited scope of security exceptions. The issue is therefore not simply whether tariffs are economically desirable, but whether executive discretion can displace legal commitments that have structured international commerce for nearly 80 years.

When Trade Is No Longer Just About Trade

Perhaps the most important consequence is conceptual. Trade policy is no longer being confined to trade. Measures directed at countries importing Venezuelan or Russian oil, tariffs justified by migration flows or fentanyl trafficking and duties imposed to obtain broader diplomatic concessions all reflect the same logic: commercial instruments are increasingly used to pursue non-commercial objectives. The distinction between trade law, foreign policy and national security is progressively disappearing.

For Europe, this evolution is not an abstract legal debate. The European Union's economic model depends upon stable rules, predictable market access and effective multilateral institutions. If the United States increasingly treats trade commitments as negotiable instruments of statecraft, Europe faces pressure to strengthen its own defensive trade measures, industrial policy and strategic autonomy.

A Choice That Will Shape the Future of the International Economic Order

The midterm elections therefore matter well beyond Washington. A Congress willing to constrain executive authority could slow the ongoing migration from rules to discretion. A political endorsement of the current approach would instead reinforce a model in which international trade is governed less by law than by bargaining power.

The deeper question raised by the American election is ultimately institutional rather than electoral. Can an international trading system built on legal commitments survive when its principal designer increasingly prefers flexibility to constraint? The answer will shape not only the future of US trade policy, but the durability of the rules-based international economic order itself.

LEONARDO BORLINI

Bocconi University
Department of Legal Studies
International Law