Lin Si

My research examines corporate governance and disclosure using empirical/archival methods. I am interested in how executives are incentivized, and how their disclosure choices relate to those incentives. I will be on the job market in AY. 2026-2027.

JOB MARKET PAPER

Incentive Contracting and Voluntary Disclosures: Do Executives Provide Guidance on What Determines Their Pay?

This study examines whether executives provide more informative (vs. opportunistic) guidance on the performance metrics conditioning their incentive plan payouts. Using metric-level data from ISS Incentive Lab and the LSEG Guidance Reports, I find that the inclusion (exclusion) of an accounting metric in an executive's incentive plan is associated with a substantially higher (lower) likelihood of guidance on that metric. Guidance issued on an incentive metric is also more likely to be lengthier, quantitative, to contain less uncertain language, and no biased tone. The relationship also extends to other metrics within the same performance category and to the horizon over which guidance is issued. Overall, the evidence indicates that incentive design and disclosure choices are aligned across accounting metrics, and that executives do not appear to be opportunistic in the guidance they issue on those metrics conditioning their incentive plan payouts.

WORKING PAPERS

• "The Voluntary Disclosure of Business Outlook Guidance" — with Xiaoxi Wu

  Accepted by the 2026 Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Conference 

  R & R for a third round at the journal

• "The Effects of ASC 606 on the Usage of Revenue-Based Targets in Executive Incentive Plans" — Sole-author

Attachments

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