Al-Habbyel Yusoph

I study how incentives, corporate governance, and regulation shape corporate strategies, with particular emphasis on risk-taking and risk management. I will be in the 2026–27 Accounting Job Market.

JOB MARKET PAPER

Executive Liability and Internal Monitoring

I study how firms adjust internal monitoring when executives face less personal liability for their corporate decisions. Lower liability may encourage riskier projects, making outcomes noisier signals of decision quality and increasing the value of information produced by internal monitors. I exploit Delaware's 2022 officer exculpation reform, which allowed firms to reduce executives' expected personal legal exposure. Using 31.6 million job postings in a triple difference design, I find that Delaware firms increase recruiting for accountants and auditors relative to other corporate and technical occupations. The response is stronger among firms with higher R&D intensity and operating uncertainty, where information about project selection and implementation is more valuable. It is weaker among firms with greater federal litigation exposure, consistent with remaining legal downside limiting the reform's effect on risk-taking incentives. Together, the findings suggest that internal monitoring becomes more valuable when executives have stronger incentives to take risks.

WORKING PAPERS

• Anticipatory Pricing under Climate Transition Risk: Evidence from U.S. Airlines — with Simon Birk and Ariela Caglio
• Executive Team Incentives and Risk-Taking — with Ariela Caglio and Francesca Franco