
MACRO RISK, ADVANCED COUNTRY CHALLENGES AND THE SHIFTING STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Michael Spence Boroli Lecture Bocconi May 2012





Le colossali asimmetrie fra paesi avanzati e paesi in via di sviluppo si stanno riducendo. Due mondi distinti convergono. Il futuro della crescita è legato alla capacità delle prossime generazioni di comprendere il modo in cui evolverà la nostra reciproca dipendenza e di trovare modi creativi per gestirla e governarla.

convergenza inevitabile

UNA VIA GLOBALE PER USCIRE DALLA CRISI

28 anticorpi GF Laterza



9

FOREIGN AFFAIRS



Safficements Are But the Problem

Fine Drawn Ware Frite Burger & Entertie Technic

Shelter Missed the Aust Spring I. Gegen Greet

What Dine Works Andrew Verber

The Coming Creat in Charactering Durid Tector in Lands Visconia

Volatile GG Prices Are Serve in May School Str. Notly A. Mahard Levi

How America Can Compete

Globalization and Unemployment Michael Spence

The Risks and Rewards of Health-Care Reform Peter Orszag

Learning From the Germans Steven Rattner

Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?

Daniel Drezner

WORKING PAPER

The Evolving Structure of the American Economy and the

Employment Challenge

Michael Spence and Sandile Hlatshwayo March 2011 Council on Foreign Relations

Periodic Systemic Risk, Multiple Equilibria and Bi-Modal Distributions



Viewpoint

March 2012

Mohamed A. El-Erian, A. Michael Spence

Systemic Risk, Multiple Equilibria and Market Dynamics – What You Need to Know and Why

Topics

- Prospects and macro risk in Europe
- Structural challenges in the advanced countries
- Emerging market growth and partial decoupling
- The middle income transition in China
- Disruptive technologies


Defective or Unsustainable Growth Models with Built In Decelerators

- Import substitution
- Excess economic diversification
- Natural resource curse
- Excess consumption (private of gov't or both)
 - Deficient investment
 - Usually excess debt
 - Excess reliance on domestic demand for growth and employment
 - USA, UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal
- Excess investment
 - Low return trap
 - China
- Resource and environmental constraints on the size of the global economy
 - Global and longer term

A Perfect Storm: Advance Country Distress


- Massive failure of counter-cyclicality in private and public sectors
- Involuntary build-up of liabilities
 - On autopilot
 - With build up of imbalances and violent reversal in balance sheet crisis and downturn
 - IMF 80% of deficit increases due to automatic stabilizers
- Growth Models with built-in decelerators
- Demographic headwinds for fiscal rebalancing and growth


G20 Countries: General Government Debt to GDP Ratios (2000 – 2015)



0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor, May 2010






Black – government Red – non-financial corporate Grey – household Green – financial institutions

EXHIBIT 1 | Net Expected Tax Revenues Are Not Adequate to Continue Funding Current Social Policies

Unfunded liabilities and official government debt



Official government debt
 Unfunded liabilities

Sources: Jagadeesh Gokhal, "Measuring the Unfunded Obligations of European Countries," 2009; OECD.

Note: Unfunded liabilities are the difference between the projected cost of continuing current government programs and net expected tax revenues. Government debt based on 2011 forecasts from the OECD.


Extreme Macro Risk and Uncertainty

- Interests are aligned globally
- Multiple players
- Resources, competence and will framework
- Known "unknowns"
 - Contagion for example
 - Clear differences (between Italy and Spain versus Greece and Portugal)
 - But we have the examples from 97-98 "Asian" currency crisis
 - Lender of last resort circuit breaker (ECB and IMF)

Multiple Equilibria and Bi-Modal Distributions


- Expectations or beliefs are explicitly part of the model endogenous
- Changes in expectations produce large changes in incentives, behavior and market outcomes
- Accurate versus self-confirmed in the context of that market structure
- Produces multiple equilibria
- Anchors and policy circuit breakers sometimes eliminate "bad" equilbria
 - Bank runs
- Eurozone
 - What are the circuit breakers?
 - Successful reform in Italy and Spain
 - Contagion control from Greek Exit
 - ECB intervention to control yields while reforms take effect

Bi-Modal Distributions



Deutsche Bank: Investment Advisory Group

Macro Risk Across the Atlantic Euro-dollar Exchange Rate Volatility



Robert Mundell

The international monetary system has become a major impediment to stability, investment and globalization

Eurozone is Current Center of Global Macro Risk

- Mostly likely scenario
 - Eurozone core holds together
 - Periphery (Greece and Portugal) exits
 - No growth model without a reset of the terms of trade
- Downside Scenario (The other "equilibrium"
 - The eurozone core comes apart with a reform failure or a lack of support from the center
 - Keys are Italy and Spain with support from the ECB and IMF
- Reasons
 - The eurozone core and the key countries have the resources and the competence
 - The big question mark is the political will at both national and EU levels
 - Resetting these economies for fiscal stability, growth and employment momentum is painful and costly
 - The issue of political will is really a question of how to fairly distribute these costs

Italy and Eurozone Stability

- Third largest sovereign debt market in the world
- Debt to GDP 120% (second to Japan)
- Highly vulnerable to escalating yields
- But (see graph) overall debt OK
- Household debt low
- Household net worth very high
- Dynamic northern economy
- New government is highly competent
- The issues are political will and support from the ECB as implement reforms
 - Market sentiment and the equilibrium shifted dramatically in the summer of 2011
 - Even if reforms are likely to succeed, the rising yields could kill the benefits, and defeat the effort
 - Tension between political moral hazard and avoiding a very bad equilibrium outcome
- This is a classic multiple equilibrium structure

What to Watch

- The status quo is an unstable non-equilibrium
- It will break one way of the other in the next year
- Greece default and exit
- ECB/EU/IMF responses to capital flight and contagion effects
- Then
- Reform momentum in Italy and Spain
- ECB again on controlling yields
- The return of external private capital flows to sovereign debt markets

Eurozone Longer Term


- Monetary union is unstable with
 - Uncertain fiscal discipline
 - Limited and reluctant fiscal transfers
 - Increasing but still limited mobility of people
 - This was known at the start
 - Monetary union was a step in a process
 - The issue is whether the process will move forward or be unwound and move back
- Stabilize first and reform the system later?
- Or do it all at the same time?
- Austerity versus growth

A Brewing Storm in the USA


- After the presidential election
 - The debt ceiling will be hit again
 - The Bush tax cuts expire
 - The payroll tax holiday expires
 - And we don't know if the new president and Congress will be able to do anything
- An investment world without a risk free asset
- Potential instability in in sovereign debt market

GDP Real Gross Domestic Product

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted



Percentage change from previous peaks seasonally Adjusted




Quarters from previous peak

INVESTMENT

Real Gross Private Domestic Investment

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted




Quarters from previous peak

Civilian Employment Population Ratio

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted


Total Employment - Establishment Survey

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted, Nonfarm Business




Real Exports of Goods & Services

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted




Real Imports of Goods & Services

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted



Quarters from previous peak

Employment in the US 1990-2008



Value Added Does not Show the Same Pattern









Figure 15. Value Added per Job, 1990-2008




Source: Authors' calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics historical data series




Structural Reform in Germany: Employment Germany (left) and US for Comparison (right)






Germany vs US: Value Added








Total Change in Value Added, 1990-2008



Germany and US: Value Added per Person








| COUN | ITRY | INCOME OF THE RICHEST 10% OVER THE POOREST 10% | INCOME OF THE RICHEST 20% OVER THE POOREST 20% | GINI COEFFICIENT |
|-------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| | | | | |
| Austr | alia | 12.5 | 7 | 35.2 |
| Austr | ia · | 6.9 | 4.4 | 29.1 |
| Belgi | um | 8.2 | 4.9 | 33 |
| Brazi | I | 51.3 | 21.8 | 57 |
| Cana | da | 9.4 | 5.5 | 32.6 |
| China | a (PRC) | 21.6 | 12.2 | 46.9 |
| Denn | nark | 8.1 | 4.3 | 24.7 |
| Finla | nd | 5.6 | 3.8 | 26.9 |
| Franc | ce | 9.1 | 5.6 | 32.7 |
| Germ | nany | 6.9 | 4.3 | 28.3 |
| Gree | ce | 10.2 | 6.2 | 34.3 |
| India | | 8.6 | 5.6 | 36.8 |
| Israe | I | 13.4 | 7.9 | 39.2 |
| Italy | | 11.6 | 6.5 | 36 |
| Japar | า | 4.5 | 3.4 | 24.9 |
| South | h Korea | 7.8 | 4.7 | 31.6 |
| Mexic | co | 24.6 | 12.8 | 46.1 |
| Neth | erlands | 9.2 | 5.1 | 30.9 |
| New | Zealand | 12.5 | 6.8 | 36.2 |
| Norw | ay | 6.1 | 3.9 | 25.8 |
| Russi | ia | 12.7 | 7.6 | 39.9 |
| South | n Africa | 33.1 | 17.9 | 57.8 |
| Spair | า | 10.3 | 6 | 34.7 |
| Swed | len | 6.2 | 4 | 25 |
| Switz | zerland | 9 | 5.5 | 33.7 |
| Turke | ey | 16.8 | 9.3 | 43.6 |
| Unite | d Kingdom | 13.8 | 7.2 | 36 |
| Unite | ed States | 15.9 | 8.4 | 40.8 |

Figure 1. COMPARING COUNTRIES' AND ECONOMIES' PERFORMANCE

Statistically significantly above the OECD average
Not statistically significantly different from the OECD average
Statistically significantly below the OECD average

| | | On the reading subscales | | | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| | On the overall reading scale | Access and retrieve | Integrate and interpret | Reflect and evaluate | Continuous feats | Non-continuous feats | On the mathematics scale | On the science scale |
| OECD average | 493 | 495 | 493 | 494 | 494 | 493 | 496 | 501 |
| Shanghai-China | 556 | 549 | 558 | 557 | 564 | 539 | 600 | 575 |
| Korea | 539 | 542 | 541 | 542 | 538 | 542 | 546 | 538 |
| Finland | 536 | 532 | 538 | 536 | 535 | 535 | 541 | 554 |
| Hong Kong-China | 233 | 530 | 530 | 540 | 538 | 522 | 222 | 549 |
| Singapore | 526 | 526 | 525 | 529 | 522 | 539 | 562 | 542 |
| Canada | 524 | 517 | 522 | 535 | 524 | 527 | 527 | 529 |
| New Zealand | 521 | 521 | 517 | 531 | 518 | 532 | 519 | 532 |
| apan | 520 | 530 | 520 | 521 | 520 | 518 | 529 | 539 |
| Australia | 515 | 513 | 513 | 523 | 513 | 524 | 514 | 527 |
| Netherlands | 508 | 519 | 504 | 510 | 506 | 514 | 526 | 522 |
| Belgium | 506 | 513 | 504 | 505 | 504 | 511 | 515 | 507 |
| Norway | 503 | 512 | 502 | 505 | 505 | 498 | 498 | 500 |
| Extonia | 501 | 508 | 500 | 503 | 497 | 512 | 512 | 528 |
| Switzerland | 501 | 505 | 502 | 497 | 498 | 505 | 534 | 517 |
| Poland | 500 | 500 | 503 | 498 | 502 | 496 | 495 | 508 |
| locland | 500 | 507 | 503 | 496 | 501 | 499 | 507 | 496 |
| United States | 500 | 492 | 495 | 512 | 500 | 503 | 487 | 502 |
| Liechtenstein | 499 | 508 | 498 | 498 | 495 | 506 | 536 | 520 |
| Sweden | 497 | 505 | 494 | 502 | 499 | 498 | 494 | 495 |
| Germany | 497 | 501 | 501 | 491 | 496 | 497 | 513 | 520 |
| reland | 496 | 498 | 494 | 502 | 497 | 496 | 487 | 508 |
| France | 496 | 492 | 497 | 495 | 492 | 498 | 497 | 498 |
| Chinese Taipei | 495 | 496 | 499 | 493 | 496 | 500 | 543 | 520 |
| Denmark | 495 | 502 | 492 | 493 | 496 | 493 | 508 | 499 |
| United Kingdom | 494 | 491 | 491 | 503 | 492 | 202 | 492 | 514 |
| Hungary | 494 | 501 | 496 | 489 | 497 | 487 | 490 | 503 |
| Portugal | 489 | 488 | 487 | 496 | 492 | 488 | 487 | 493 |
| Macao-China | 487 | 493 | 488 | 481 | 488 | 481 | 525 | 511 |
| Italy | 486 | 482 | 490 | 482 | 489 | 476 | 483 | 489 |
| Latvia | 484 | 476 | 484 | 492 | 484 | 487 | 482 | 494 |


Figure 1. Cross-Country Average Labor's Share in National Income (Ratio of labor income to national income)



Source: OECD, Structural Analysis Database.

US INCOME SHARES

CHART 7



The Developing Countries: What is the Next Convergence?

- Before the Industrial Revolution
- 200 years of divergence
- Post World War II: Reversal of the Divergence Pattern
- Now mid way through a century of convergence of developing and advanced economies
- The convergence process is causing a massive increase in the size of the global economy
 - Likely to triple in size in the next 25 years

What is High Speed Growth

| • | In the 200 year | s of industrialization | 2.0% | 36 years |
|---|-----------------|------------------------|------|----------|
|---|-----------------|------------------------|------|----------|

- Post war advanced country growth
 2.5%
 29 years
- High speed developing country growth 7.0 10% 10-7 years

Key Elements in Sustained High Growth in Developing Countries

- A functioning market system
- The global economy
 - Knowledge transfer and catch up growth
 - Market Size and specialization
- Very high rates of overall saving and investment
- An effective government that supports and complements the private sector dynamics
- Structural change and economic diversification
- Inclusiveness and a reasonable degree of equity
- Powerful employment engines in the modernizing part of the economy in both the tradable and non-tradable parts of the economy
- Leadership
- A pragmatic, persistent, experimental approach to policy
- Complexity does not cause paralysis

When Does It Fail?

- Leadership
- Failures of governance
 - But the form of governance is not highly correlated with economic performance
- Pursuit of other objectives than growth
- Natural resource distortions of political
- National identity not formed
- Low rates of public sector investment
- "Bad," meaning misguided strategy
- Inclusiveness failure

Why Does It Matter?

- Growth engines
- Major markets
- Investment opportunities
- But also huge challenges
 - Stability
 - Equity and Distribution
 - Sustainability
 - Natural Resources
 - Unsustainable Growth Models
 - Governance without a dominant West
- This really is a completely "New Normal"

Global Energy Consumption The Multi-dimensional Adding Up Problem




Fig. 6.2 IIASA projection of future energy-demand scenario A1 (high growth). IIASA projections show that energy demand in the twenty-first century is dominated by the growth of the developing nations.


Source: Burton Richter, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors, 2011

Commodity Prices

Exhibit E1

Commodity prices have increased sharply since 2000, erasing all the declines of the 20th century

MGI Commodity Price Index (years 1999-2001 = 100)1



See the methodology appendix for details of the MGI Commodity Price Index.


SOURCE: Grilli and Yang; Stephan Pfaffenzeller; World Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); UN Comtrade; McKinsey analysis

^{2 2011} prices are based on average of the first eight months of 2011.

DEVELOPING COUNTRY GROWTH SET TO PRODUCE A GLOBAL INVESTMENT BOOM

AND PROBABLY UPWARD PRESSURE ON INTEREEST RATES AND THE COSTS OF CAPITAL

Global investment rate, 1970–2030 % of global GDP



¹ Based on actual prices and exchange rates of each year.

CONSENSUS GLOBAL

GROWTH SCENARIO

Historical trend

Historical trend

in real terms²


in nominal terms1

² Shown in 2005 prices and exchange rates.

³ Forecast assumes price of capital goods increases at same rate as other goods and assumes no change in inventory.

Relative Price of Manufactured Goods


Figure 11 Chinese-Led Decline in Manufacturing Prices



Source: Development Economics Prospects Group, World Bank.

CO2 Emissions: The Status Quo

Figure 1. CO₂ Emissions per Capita




Source: IPCC and Human Development Report 2007/2008 (UNDP).

One ton of carbon equals = 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide. A price of \$30 per ton of carbon dioxide equals a price of \$110 per ton of carbon.

Global Annual Emissions Under BAU will Double or More Going to 4 Times the "Safe" Level

Figure 4. Total Global Emissions (Gigatons)




Source: Author's calculations.

The safe level in total emissions is about 15 gigatons of CO2

What Does It Mean?

- All countries, with Asia in the lead, will have to invent a new growth model over time
 - Some prefer the no growth path
 - The developing countries will not accept it
- Advanced countries have major structural adaptations to undertake to thrive in this new world
- Global and regional governance institutions will have to be developed or made more effective

Partial Decoupling Less Dependence on Advanced Country Growth Figure 1




How Decoupled Are They and Why?

- They are partially decoupled
 - They can sustain pre crisis growth even if advanced countries are flat
 - But not if there is a major downturn in the advanced countries
- Why?
 - Economic size of EM group
 - Trade within EM group
 - Higher incomes and closer match between demand and supply sides of the economy
 - The network structure of global has shifted
- Downside Risks
 - Europe
 - Protectionism and
 - Slowdown in China
 - China's growth has become an important growth engine
 - Main export partner for Japan, Korea, India, Brazil, Australia,

China Entering the Middle Income Transition

- In a fragile global economy with significant downside risks
- At a scale never before seen or tried
- It is a complex set of structural changes on the demand and supply sides of the economy
- Market expands: state recedes
- Government changes its role to creating the hard and soft infrastructure that supports the market driven economic diversification and productivity growth
- It has been done before in other countries and it is not easy to sustain the growth


Middle Income Slowdowns are Common



Five High Speed Transitions

- Japan
- Korea
- Taiwan/China
- Hong Kong/China
- Singapore
- None at China's scale

China: Disposable Income Declining Percentage of National Income



China Has to Climb the Valued Added Ladder to Growth

- That means structural transformation
- Keys to Implementation
 - More household income
 - Less low return investment (public and SOE)
 - More market lead diversification and innovation, less state
 - Supporting policies
 - Competition policy
 - Human capital and technology
 - Financial sector development
- Major implementation risk
 - Vested interests cloaked in ideological differences, equity issues and (deliberate misinterpretation of) failures in the west
 - SOE's and competition
 - Reform momentum and the governance structure

Requirements are Understood and Embedded in the 12th Five Year Plan

- Significant change in the investment system
 - Shift from investment led to rate of return led growth
- Shift in structure of income side of the economy shift toward the household sector
 - The Lewis turning point
- Elimination of low return investment
- Market takes larger role in driving structural change
- Government role shifts to innovation and human capital investment and the knowledge and technological underpinnings
- Financial sector development to expand savings options and recycle savings to productive (high return) investment
- Corporate governance
- Expansion of social insurance and services with a focus on inclusion
- Urban service sector needs to take over from labor intensive process manufacturing as main entry level employment engine

Markets and the Evolving Role of the State

- Market strengths
 - Efficiency, innovation, growth
 - With qualifications for externalities, informational asymmetries and coordination/multiple equilibrium issues
- Vulnerabilities
 - Stability, equity, sustainability and structural adaptation
 - Networks and local optimization
 - Global labor supply and rising return to capital, including human capital
- Substantial and Healthy State Balance Sheet
 - Capacity to respond to shocks
 - Recycle income when distributional trends are adverse
 - Capacity to invest in structural change
 - Capturing some of the return on public investment in knowledge and technology base of the economy

Role and Resources of the State?

Roles

- Shock absorber for internal and external shocks
- Building the human capital, skills, and knowledge base of the economy
- Dealing with distributional issues that depend on shifting technological and global market conditions
- Regulating for stability (domestic and int'l)
- Adapting growth patterns for economic, social, political and natural resource sustainability


Resources

- Policy instruments
- Balance sheets
- Adaptability to changing global conditions
- Ability to act the ability to resolve the inevitable distributional issues involved in rebalancing


Game Changing Technologies

- Shale Gas
- Mobile phones
- 3D Printing


Shale Gas




Location of Shale Gas




Conventional and Shale Gas Reserves



Mobile Phone Growth: Elimination of the Digital Divide



The Digital Divide is Vanishing



3D Printing Could Become a Manufacturing Technology



