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Research Interests

Primary: Political Economy

Secondary: Empirical IO, Public Economics

Education

PhD in Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy — 2021–present

Visiting PhD Student, Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley, USA — Feb.–Jul. 2025
Host: Francesco Trebbi

M.A. in Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia — 2019–2021

B.Sc. & M.Sc. in Geography, Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia — 2014–2020

References

Guido Tabellini
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Francesco Trebbi
Professor, Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley
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Job Market Paper

What Do Populist Voters Want? A Nonparametric Revealed Preference Approach
Paper | VoxEU column

Abstract: This paper proposes a nonparametric revealed-preference approach for identification and estimation of voter preferences from aggregate election returns in a multidimensional spatial voting model. I apply it to study the rise of populism in Germany, using the municipal-level results for four federal (Bundestag) elections between 2013 and 2025 and modeling political competition along the Left–Right and Anti-Elite dimensions. The results reveal a transformation in the basis of support for the radical-right populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD): what began primarily as anti-elite voting became increasingly aligned with the party's right-wing positions. By 2021, the left–right dimension accounts for as much as 70% of AfD support. Counterfactuals in 2025 suggest that a modest rightward shift by the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) attracts about one-fifth of AfD voters if the AfD's position is fixed. When allowed to respond strategically, however, the AfD moves further right and reverses these gains; in equilibrium, the CDU does not move right. These results may explain why establishment parties struggle to reclaim populist voters despite apparent ideological openings.

Working Papers

Do Elections Moderate or Polarize Political Rhetoric? (with Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini)
Paper | VoxEU column

Abstract: We study the communication strategies on Twitter-X of 367 political leaders in 21 countries, focusing on electoral competition between populists and non-populists. We measure polarization by the ease with which the leader can be classified as populist or not, conditional on their tweet. We find that political rhetoric becomes more polarized before and around election dates. This happens because, in pre-electoral quarters, opposite leaders are more likely to: (i) talk about different topics, and (ii) frame differently the same issues. Our results are consistent with competing politicians targeting different voters, rather than appealing to the same swing voters.

What Matters to Voters? Identifying Important Ideological Dimensions with Partial Rankings of Parties

Paper

Abstract: I propose a method to identify which ideological dimensions matter to voters. It applies a spatial voting framework to partial party rankings: a dimension rationalizes any ranking consistent with proximity voting along it. I take the method to the German Longitudinal Election Study, 2013–2022, which elicits respondents' three most-preferred parties, together with expert survey placements of parties on seven ideological dimensions (Left–Right, economy, culture and anti-elite, among others). In one dimension, Left–Right rationalizes 40–50% of reported rankings in every year, more than any dimension considered and more than a random one would; from 2017 onward, no conceivable dimension rationalizes a larger share. In two dimensions, the economy–culture pair performs best. Both models explain less over time, while the anti-elite dimension gains explanatory power, rising by about 2 percentage points per year and matching the economic dimension by 2022; this rise is driven by supporters of mainstream parties. These patterns are consistent with a shift in political conflict from the traditional Left–Right dimension toward an anti-elite, or populist, dimension.

Campus Political Climate and University Choice: Evidence from France (with Raphaelle Aulagnon)

Paper

Abstract: Do political preferences shape where students choose to study? We investigate this question in France, combining administrative data on the universe of Parcoursup applicants with a conjoint survey experiment conducted with 1,040 final-year high school students. In the administrative data, students are more likely to apply to universities whose campus political climate aligns with the political leaning of their ZIP code, controlling for student, university, and major fixed effects, and the same applicant tailors the political content of her statements of purpose to the leaning of each institution. In the conjoint experiment, where alignment is randomly assigned, campus political climate carries a weight comparable to that of distance: students are willing to travel approximately one additional hour to attend a politically aligned institution, and 72% of surveyed students report that a university whose political atmosphere differed strongly from their own would make them hesitate to attend. We then combine the two data sources, using the conjoint estimates to correct the administrative estimates for endogeneity. Counterfactual simulations quantify the effect of a taste for political alignment: it leads students to attend programs 2.6 kilometers farther from home. The effects are heterogeneous by academic grade, socio-economic background, and political leaning: it pulls centrist students toward more distant, more expensive, and more selective programs, and left-leaning students in the opposite direction.

Work in Progress

Party Lines: Ideology and Political Language in the U.S. House (with Leonardo Bianchi)

Abstract: Political parties unite politicians of differing ideologies, yet incentives to follow the party line may limit how visibly these differences are expressed. We study whether within-party ideological divisions among U.S. House candidates are reflected in their language on Twitter, comparing personal and campaign accounts with official accounts. An ideological split explains how co-partisans speak better than most alternative partitions, especially on personal and campaign accounts (98th percentile for Democrats, 77th for Republicans). On official accounts, the relationship weakens for Democrats and disappears for Republicans, consistent with party pressure pulling institutional communication towards the party line.

Teaching Experience

Political Economics (Graduate), Professor Guido Tabellini	Fall 2023, 2024, 2025
Political Economics (Graduate), Professor Edoardo Teso	Fall 2026
International Relations (Undergraduate), Professor Massimo Morelli	Fall 2024

Honors

UniCredit Fellowship	2026–27
Fondazione Romeo ed Enrica Invernizzi Scholarship	2025–26, 2026–27
IGIER PhD 5th Year Scholarship	2025–26
Scholarship of the "Safmar" Foundation, New Economic School	2020–2021
DAAD Fellow	2019

OTHER

Languages: Russian (native), English (fluent), German (B2), Italian (A2)
Citizenship: Russian